Cooperation is a conundrum that has challenged researchers across disciplines and over many generations. In mathematical models, cooperation simply refers to behavioral actions that bene t others at some cost to an actor. Prima facie, defectors always outperform cooperators, but groups of cooperating individuals fare better than groups of noncooperating defectors. However, each individual faces the temptation to defect in order to avoid the costs of cooperation while free-riding on the bene ts produced by others. This generates a con ict of interest between the individual and the group known as a social dilemma (Dawes ; Hauert et al. ) . Social dilemmas are abundant in nature. For example, musk oxen create defense formations to protect their young from wolves (Hamilton ) . However, each ox would be better o and avoid potential injury by standing in the second line-but if every individual behaves in this way, their defense formation breaks down and the group becomes prone to attacks by wolves. A similar con ict of interest occurs in sentinel behavior in meerkats (Clutton-Brock et al. ) : a few individuals are on the lookout for predators and warn foraging group members of impending danger. Spotting the predators rst returns a direct bene t to the sentinels because they get a head Mathematical Models of Cooperation C H 514-52402_ch01_1P.indd 115 514-52402_ch01_1P.indd 115 12/6/12 6:37 PM 12/6/12 6:37 PM start on nding shelter. At the same time, the costs for keeping watch depend on the individuals' hunger. From time to time sentinels abandon their position and get replaced by other individuals. Other prominent examples of social dilemmas occur in predator inspection behavior in sh (Milinski ; Magurran and Higham ; Pitcher ) , in phages competing for reproduction (Turner and Chao , ) , or in microorganisms producing extra cellular products such as enzymes in yeast (Greig and Travisano ) , bio lms (Rainey and Rainey ), or antibiotic re sis tance (Neu ) . Social dilemmas also occurred on an evolutionary scale and life could not have unfolded without the repeated incorporation of entities of lower complexity or degrees of self-organization into higher-level entities. Major transitions such as the formation of chromosomes out of replicating DNA molecules, the transition from single cells to multicellular organisms, or the change from individuals to societies all require cooperation (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry ). Finally, humans have taken the problem of cooperation to yet another level (Hardin ) when it comes to social welfare such as health care or pension plans and, even more importantly, to global issues concerning natural resources such as drinking water, clean air, sheries, or climate change (Milinski et al. ). In order to analyze individual behavior in social dilemmas or other types of interactions, the economist Oscar Morgenstern and the mathematician John von Neumann developed a mathematical framework termed game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern ). The most prominent game to study cooperation in social dilemmas is the prisoner's dilemma (Flood ; Axelrod and Hamilton ) . In the prisoner's dilemma, two individuals decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Cooperation incurs costs, c, to the actor while the bene ts of cooperation, b, accrue exclusively to the opponent with b > c. Defection does not incur costs to the actor and produces no bene ts for the opponent. Thus, if both players cooperate, each receives b − c, whereas if both defect, neither receives anything. If only one cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator is left with the costs, − c, while the defector receives the full bene t, b. In this situation, defection should dominate because individuals are better o defecting, irrespective of the opponent's decision. Consequently, two rational players will opt for defection and end up with nothing, as opposed to the more favorable reward, b − c, for mutual cooperation.
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Evolutionary Dynamics
The predicted dominance of defection in social dilemmas, however, contrasts with abundant evidence of cooperation in nature. Ever since Darwin (Darwin ) , the evolution, and maintenance of cooperation has posed a major challenge to evolutionary biologists and social scientists. The theoretical foundation for addressing the problem of cooperation rests on Hamilton's kin selection theory (Hamilton ) and Maynard Smith's adaptation of game theory to evolutionary scenarios (Maynard Smith and Price ), by linking game theoretical payo s with biological tness. In evolutionary biology, tness denotes the single determinant of evolutionary success and essentially re ects the reproductive output of individuals over their life span. Thus, under Darwinian selection, behavioral traits (or strategies) of individuals with high tness are more likely to be passed on to future generations.
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Consider a population with a fraction x cooperators (and − x defectors). If individuals randomly engage in prisoner's dilemma interactions, the average payo s for defectors is f D = xb (with probability x the defector interacts with a cooperator and obtains the bene t b); for cooperators it is f C = xb − c (with probability x the cooperator interacts with another cooperator and receives b but always pays the costs of cooperation c); and for the entire
. Selection prescribes that strategies that perform better than the population on average increase in abundance. In the simplest case this leads to the replicator equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund ):
which states that the change in frequency of cooperators (x · denotes the time derivative of the fraction of cooperators) is proportional to the payo di erence between cooperators and the population average. Since f c − f = −c( − x) < 0, cooperators decrease over time and eventually disappear (x* = 0 is the only stable xed point). In order to model the promotion and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals, a variety of approaches have been proposed -1-0-+1-
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over the last few de cades. In par tic u lar, cooperation can be established through conditional behavioral rules in repeated encounters (Trivers ). If behavioral actions are re ected in an individual's reputation, repeated interactions are not required to establish cooperation (Nowak and Sigmund ) . Moreover, punishment of defectors (Yamagishi ; Sigmund, Hauert, and Nowak ) , or voluntary interactions (Hauert et al. , ) , also promote and sustain cooperation. Finally, spatial extension and limited local interactions can enhance cooperation, which is the topic of the second part of this chapter.
Another complementary approach to address the problem of cooperation is to reconsider the mathematical implementation of the social dilemma. In contrast to the theoretical e ort expended on studying the prisoner's dilemma, it receives surprisingly little support from empirical evidence in biological systems. In fact, in all of the prominent examples of social dilemmas listed above, it remains largely unresolved whether individuals indeed engage in prisoner's dilemma type interactions. Instead, another game, called the snowdrift game (Sugden ; Hauert and Doebeli ) , seems to be a biologically appealing alternative to the prisoner's dilemma (Doebeli and Hauert ) . The anecdotal story behind the snowdrift game states that two drivers are caught in a blizzard and trapped on either side of a snowdrift. Each driver has the option to remove the snowdrift and start shoveling or to remain in the cozy warmth of the car. If both cooperate and shovel, they both get home while sharing the labor, but if only one shovels, again both get home, but the cooperator has to do all the work. If no one shovels, neither gets anywhere, and they have to wait for spring to melt the snowdrift. In contrast to the prisoner's dilemma, the best strategy now depends on the coplayer's decision: if the other driver shovels, it is best to shirk, but when facing the potential for a lazy counterpart, it is better to start shoveling instead of remaining stuck in the snow.
The snowdrift game potentially seems to apply whenever individuals generate a valuable public resource. For example, in antibiotic re sis tance (Neu ) bacteria (Staphylococci) secrete an enzyme, βlactamase, that destroys penicillin. The production of this enzyme is costly to the bacterium, while the resulting protection represents a public resource that bene ts not only the enzyme-producing bacterium but also its fellow bacteria. Thus, in the vicinity of enzyme producers it pays for a bacterium to throttle enzyme production and increase replication, but in the absence of the enzyme, protection against penicillin becomes vital.
The evolutionary dynamics of the snowdrift game can again be analyzed using the replicator equation. For mutual cooperation the costs are shared and each individual receives b − c/2, whereas a cooperator facing a defector obtains b − c. The payo s for defectors remain the same as in the prisoner's dilemma, with b against a cooperator and zero for mutual defection. Thus, the average payo of cooperators becomes f C = b − c( − x/2), and the average payo for defectors remains f D = xb. A short calculation shows that, in the snowdrift game, the replicator equation admits another xed point that is stable (obtained by setting f C = f ) at x* = − r, where r = c/(2b − c) denotes the cost-to-net-bene t ratio of mutual cooperation. Consequently, cooperators and defectors coexist in the snowdrift game. Nevertheless, the con ict of interest persists because a population at x* is still worse o than if everybody had cooperated. Hence, the snowdrift game represents a relaxed social dilemma as compared to the prisoner's dilemma.
Adaptive Dynamics
In nature, the problem of cooperation may not always be adequately addressed by limiting the analysis to two distinct strategic types-the cooperators and the defectors. Instead, in many situations, it might be more appropriate to consider continuous degrees of cooperation such as time and e ort expended in producing a public resource. In such continuous games, the strategy or trait u of an individual denotes its cooperative investment and can vary between zero and an upper limit u max . The tness costs and bene ts are determined by the increasing functions C(u) and B(u), respectively, such that an increase in the cooperative trait u both raises costs and increases bene ts. Moreover, no cooperation (u = 0) neither provides benets nor incurs costs,
In the continuous prisoner's dilemma, the payo of an individual with trait u interacting with a trait v individual is written as
This means that the bene ts are determined by the opponent's trait, whereas the costs are determined by the individual's own trait. Thus, the only way to improve the payo is to lower the costs, and hence the degree of cooperation, because C(u) < C(u + Δu) for Δu > 0. Consequently, evolution, when modeled on the dynamics of continuous prisoner's dilemma interactions, selects lower investors such that cooperation gradually declines and eventually disappears.
The situation is rather di erent in the continuous snowdrift game (Doebeli, Hauert, and Killingback ). In the previous section the snowdrift game was introduced by assuming constant bene ts and costs that are shared among cooperators. Mathematically, this is equivalent to assuming that costs are constant and bene ts depend on the number of cooperators. In the continuous snowdrift game, the payo to an individual with trait u interacting with a trait v individual then becomes P (u,v) 
holds at least for small u, it seems that evolution should select intermediate degrees of cooperation. However, it turns out that the evolutionary dynamics of the continuous snowdrift game are much richer.
The evolution of the trait u can be analyzed using the adaptive dynamics framework (Dieckmann and Law ; Metz et al. ; Geritz et al. ) . This assumes a homogeneous resident population with trait u. Occasionally, an initially rare mutant trait v appears and attempts to invade. The tness of the mutant type is given by P(v, u)-interactions with its own type, P (v,v) , can be neglected because the mutant is rare. According to the replicator equation, the mutant increases in abundance if P(v, u) exceeds the average population payo -namely, the tness of the resident, P(u, u)-interactions of the resident with the mutant are again neglected because the mutant is rare. Thus, the growth rate of the mutant v is given by f u (v) = P(v, u) − P (u, u) and is called the invasion tness because for f u (v) > 0 invasion succeeds, but fails for f u (v) < 0. If mutations are small, such that v is close to u, it follows that whenever invasion succeeds ( f u (v) > 0), the mutant v eventually takes over and becomes the new resident (Geritz et al. ) . Mutations are assumed to be rare, such that mutants always face a homogeneous resident population. Under these assumptions, the selection gradient D(u) determines whether more or less cooperative mutants can invade. For D(u) > 0 mutants with v > u can invade and cooperation increases, but it decreases for D(u) < 0. Thus, the evolutionary change of cooperation is given by the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics, u · = D(u) (Metz et al. ) . Of par ticu lar interest are singular traits u*, for which the selection gradient vanishes, D(u*) = 0, and hence denote xed points of the adaptive dynamics (u · = 0). If no singular trait u* exists in the interval (0, u max ), then either cooperation keeps decreasing, D(u) < 0, as in the continuous prisoner's dilemma, or it keeps increasing until u max is reached. The latter refers to situations where the social dilemma is fully relaxed and cooperation merely evolves as a byproduct (Connor, ) . Both cases are possible in continuous snowdrift games (see Figure . ).
The Origin of Cooperators and Defectors
The dynamics of cooperation become more interesting if the continuous snowdrift game admits singular traits. A singular trait u* can be convergent stable such that traits in the vicinity of u* converge to u* (see Figure . an evolutionary end state because u* either represents a maximum or a minimum of the invasion tness. 2 If it is a maximum, then u* is not only convergent stable but also evolutionarily stable and u* indeed denotes stable intermediate degrees of cooperation (see Figure . b ). If, however, u* denotes a tness minimum, then both, more and less cooperative mutants can invade. In this case u* is called an evolutionary branching point and the population undergoes a spontaneous division into two distinct trait groups of cooperators and defectors (see Figure . a). Thus, the evolutionary dynamics recovers the original snowdrift game discussed above. The continuous snowdrift game therefore suggests an evolutionary pathway for social diversi cation and for the origin of cooperators and defectors (Doebeli, Hauert, and Killingback ). All scenarios can be further explored using the EvoLudo (Hauert ), a growing collection of interactive tutorials on evolutionary dynamics.
Two Tragedies
Social dilemmas potentially occur whenever individuals supply a public resource, such as in the case of antibiotic re sis tance (Neu ) , or whenever individuals consume a public resource, such as in Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin ) . Individual interests cause public resources to become overexploited. In the context of humans, this is hardly surprising-Aristotle ( -) already drew the same conclusion: "That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it." The continuous snowdrift game serves as a model of social dilemmas and may equally apply to communal enterprises in humans. However, the spontaneous separation into coexisting cooperators and defectors could additionally raise a Tragedy of the Commune (Doebeli, Hauert, and Killingback ) , which states that evolution may not favor egalitarian contributions to the common good but instead promote highly asymmetric commitments. However, di erences in cooperative contributions bear a formidable risk for escalating con icts based on the accepted notion of fairness.
Spatial Games
According to the replicator equation, Eq. ( ), cooperators are doomed and disappear in the prisoner's dilemma in the absence of supporting mechanisms, -1-0-+1-
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whereas in the snowdrift game coexistence of cooperators and defectors is expected. These predictions are based on the assumption that individuals randomly interact with other members of the population. This is a con venient assumption because it admits a full analysis. However, more realistic scenarios should take spatial extension and local interactions into account. In order to model this, individuals are arranged on a rectangular lattice and each individual interacts only with neighbors on its four adjacent sites. The population is then updated according to a spatial analogue of the replicator equation: rst, a focal individual is randomly selected and its payo , f f , is determined through interactions with all its neighbors. Second, a neighbor of the focal individual is randomly chosen and its payo , f n , is determined in the same way. Third, the focal individual adopts the strategy of the neighbor with a probability proportional to the payo di erence, provided that the neighbor performs better, and sticks to its own strategy otherwise. This procedure is repeated many times in order to determine the equilibrium frequency and con guration of cooperators and defectors. Note that for increasing population and neighborhood sizes, this microscopic update rule recovers the replicator equation (Traulsen, Claussen, and Hauert ) . Unfortunately, the dynamics of spatial systems is no longer analytically accessible, and results are either based on a technique called pair approximation (Matsuda et al. ; van Baalen and Rand ; Szabó and Hauert a), or, as in the following, on simulation data.
In the spatial prisoner's dilemma, cooperators are able to survive by forming clusters (Nowak and May ; Ohtsuki et al. ; Taylor, Day, and Wild ). Compact clusters increase interactions with other cooperators, while reducing exploitation by defectors . However, the clustering advantages are limited, and the equilibrium fraction of cooperators decreases when costs are increased or bene ts are lowered (see Figure . a). Eventually, cooperators are unable to survive and go extinct. E ects of spatial structure, and hence the characteristic features of spatial con gurations, are most pronounced near the extinction threshold of cooperators (see Figure . b ).
Upon approaching the extinction threshold, the population exhibits interesting dynamical features as it undergoes a critical phase transition ( Szabó & Hauert b )-a well-studied phenomenon in statistical mechanics. Critical phase transitions are exciting for physicists but may not seem exceedingly important in biologically relevant scenarios. However, they do have substantial implications with far reaching consequences. For example, small changes in the costs or bene ts can have disastrous e ects on the equilibrium state of the population. Figure . a illustrates that variations in the cost-bene t ratio r near the extinction threshold of cooperators result in big changes in their equilibrium frequency. Moreover, for populations that are prone to extinction, this indicates intrinsic di culties for the empirical assessment of the current state because spatial and temporal variation increases when approaching the critical threshold.
Based on the results of the prisoner's dilemma in spatially extended settings, it has become widely accepted that spatial extension with limited local interactions is bene cial for cooperation. However, this does not necessarily apply to social dilemmas in general (Hauert and Doebeli ; Hauert ) . In par tic u lar, in the spatial snowdrift game, the equilibrium proportion of cooperators tends to be lower than in unstructured settings with random interactions (see Figure . a). Only for very low costs or high bene ts does spatial structure support cooperation, but for most values cooperation is reduced and even gets eliminated altogether if costs are high or bene ts are low. -1-0-+1-
The fact that in the snowdrift game the best option of one individual depends on the opponent's behavior, such that it is best to choose a strategy that is di erent from the opponent, often prevents cooperators from forming compact clusters as in the spatial prisoner's dilemma. Instead of minimizing the boundary between cooperators and defectors to avoid exploitation, the characteristics of the snowdrift game tend to maximize this boundary, which results in dendritic or lament-like cluster shapes. These cluster shapes become most apparent near the extinction threshold of cooperators (see Figure . b ). An intuitive approximation of the extinction threshold is obtained by considering the payo of a single isolated cooperator in the spatial snowdrift game. As soon as the cooperator's payo drops below the payo of its defecting neighbors it perishes. Note, however, that this scenario underestimates the actual extinction threshold because of larger patches of cooperators. On average, the lament-like structures generate an advantage for defectors because of increased exploitation along the fractal-like boundary between cooperators and defectors. This results in an overall reduction of cooperators when compared to unstructured populations. The EvoLudo site (Hauert ) encourages further interactive explorations and comparisons of the fascinating spatiotemporal dynamics in di erent types of spatial games.
Conclusions
The most prominent mathematical model to study the evolution of cooperation is the prisoner's dilemma. Only more recently has the snowdrift game attracted increasing attention as a viable and biologically interesting alternative for modeling cooperation dynamics. For example, RNA phages engage in prisoner's dilemma interactions in cells (Turner and Chao ) , but selection alters the payo structure, leading to the stable coexistence of cooperating and defecting types in a snowdrift game (Turner and Chao ) . Unfortunately, di erentiating between the two games can be challenging in real populations because the determination of payo s is notoriously difcult. For example, predator inspection in sticklebacks is an often-cited application of the prisoner's dilemma (Milinski ) . Sophisticated experimental setups con rmed the payo ranking for three out of the four possible behavioral outcomes (Milinski et al. ) . However, only the missing ranking of the payo for mutual defection would enable one to discriminate between the prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games. Other well-known examples of potential snowdrift games include alarm calls in meerkats (Clutton-Brock et al. ) , and ghting in large ungulates (Wilkinson and Shank ) . Cooperation is ubiquitous in meerkats, whereas serious escalations of ghts seem to be common in musk ox. Because the costs of alarm calls are small, whereas the costs of forgoing reproduction are high, both observations are in agreement with the spatial snowdrift game, which promotes cooperation for low cost-to-bene t ratios but suggests more frequent escalations for high ratios of cost-to-bene t (Hauert and Doebeli ) . The signi cance and scienti c value of game theoretical models for understanding the evolution of cooperation does not primarily lie in their predictive power for par tic u lar applications to speci c scenarios. Instead, these games represent a conceptual framework to highlight and to emphasize the rich and often-unexpected dynamics generated by simple models that capture the essence of biologically and socially relevant interaction patterns. For example, the snowdrift game demonstrates that spatial structure may not be as universally bene cial for cooperation as previously thought, based on results of the spatial prisoner's dilemma. Similarly, evolutionary branching in the continuous snowdrift game illustrates that distinct behavioral traits may easily originate in a continuum of behavioral options. Game theoretical results delineate evolutionary constraints that are critical in resolving the problem of cooperation.
In theoretical and evolutionary biology, the ambiguity and limited consensus on the usage of the terms "cooperation," "altruism" and "helping" can cause some disputes but generally pose less severe problems than in the interdisciplinary discourse of this book. In all theoretical investigations, the starting point as well as the concluding results are unambiguous mathematical statements. Misunderstandings are readily averted by resorting to the mathematics. Instead, the core challenge lies in the proper translation of biological questions into tractable mathematical models as well as in interpreting the mathematical results in meaningful biological terms. 
